The Legal Boundaries for Impartiality of IDEA Hearing Officers: An Update by Zirkel, Perry A.
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 8 
4-15-2021 
The Legal Boundaries for Impartiality of IDEA Hearing Officers: An 
Update 
Perry A. Zirkel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj 
 Part of the Disability Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Education 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Perry A. Zirkel, The Legal Boundaries for Impartiality of IDEA Hearing Officers: An Update, 21 Pepp. Disp. 
Resol. L.J. 257 (2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Katrina.Gallardo@pepperdine.edu, 
anna.speth@pepperdine.edu, linhgavin.do@pepperdine.edu. 
[Vol. 21: 257, 2021]                               Impartiality of IDEA Hearing Officers 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 257 
The Legal Boundaries for 
Impartiality of IDEA Hearing 
Officers: An Update 
 
Perry A. Zirkel 
 
Special education has become a significant area of 
litigation in the K-12 school context.1  The primary reasons 
include: (1) the highly prescriptive and detailed 
requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(“IDEA”)2 and its regulations,3 and (2) its user-friendly right 
of private action via an “impartial due process hearing,”4 
with the state option of a review officer tier5 and the ultimate 
right of judicial appeal.6 
As a result, the impartial hearing officer (“IHO”) is 
the fulcrum of this adjudicative process under the IDEA.7  
 
1  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The "Explosion" in Education 
Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011) (revealing the 
upward trajectory of IDEA litigation within the relatively level trend of K–12 
litigation within the past three decades). 
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1419 (2019). 
3 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1–300.537 (2020). 
4 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(b).  The number of states opting for 
a review officer tier has decreased from twenty-six in 1991 to eight in 2019.  
Jennifer F. Connolly et al., State Due Process Hearing Systems under the IDEA: 
An Update, 30 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 156, 157–58 (2019) (identifying 
Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and South 
Carolina); see also Lisa Lukasik, Special-Education Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis of North Carolina’s First Tier, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 745 n.38 
(2016) (identifying Oklahoma as an additional state with a review officer tier). 
5 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g); 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(b). 
6  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516.  For the IDEA exhaustion 
provision, see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(l); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 
(2017) (requiring exhaustion of claims that are based on the IDEA obligation 
of providing a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”)). 
7  The IDEA also provides for an alternative decisional dispute resolution 
process at the administrative level that is investigative rather than adjudicative.  
E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws and Guidance for Complaint Procedures 
1
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However, the IDEA only provides for the two standards for 
impartiality, stating that “at a minimum” IHOs shall not be: 
“(I) an employee of the State educational agency or the local 
educational agency involved in the education or care of the 
child;  or (II) a person having a personal or professional 
interest that conflicts with the person's objectivity in the 
hearing.” 8   The first of these two standards is a per se 
prohibition, whereas the second one is an ad hoc conflict-of-
interest standard depending on the specific situational 
circumstances.9 
The framework of remaining standards are left—via 
the IDEA’s structure of “cooperative federalism”10—to state 
laws.11  Ultimately, the courts serve as the chief cartographer 
for the legal boundaries of IDEA IHO impartiality in their 
interpretation, gap-filling, and application of the federal and 
 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 368 EDUC. L. REP. 24 
(2019); Perry A. Zirkel, The Two Dispute Decisional Processes under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Empirical Comparison, 16 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 169 (2017); Perry A. Zirkel, A Comparison of the IDEA’s 
Dispute Resolution Complaint Procedures and Due Process Hearings, 326 
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2016). 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(a)(i)(I)–(II) 
9 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(a)(i)(I)–(II) 
10 E.g., Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 733–34 (2d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005)); 
Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215, 1223 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (recognizing that 
states may add requirements to the IDEA’s foundation). 
11  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process Hearings under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 
3, 17 (2019); see also Andrew Lee & Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due 
Process Hearings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act III: The 
Prehearing Stage, 40 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY (forthcoming 
spring 2021) (canvassing recusal provisions).  For the limited additional 
impartiality requirements for review officers under the IDEA, see e.g., N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 279.1(c) (2018).  For the separable role of 
codes of conduct for administrative law judges to the extent that they are not 
incorporated in state (or federal) laws, see generally Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role 
of Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 321 (2002).  
For an example of a customized code of conduct and related procedural forms 
for IDEA IHOs, see e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION MANUAL 57 (2017), available at www.odr-pa.org (including a 
prefatory clarification of not having the force of law).  
2
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state framework.12  Unlike the “thin” impartiality standard 
often associated with public school student disciplinary 
hearings, 13  the primary competing analogies are the 
appearance of bias approach that generally applies to 
judges14 and the less strict approach that is closer to actual 
bias and that generally applies—due to their small close-knit 
context—to labor arbitrators.15 
 
Previous Research 
As reviewed in the springboard synthesis for this 
update,16 the previous research relating at least in part to 
IDEA IHO impartiality is notably limited in date, location, 
and focus.17  Only two prior analyses were comprehensive 
 
12 The secondary sources are the decisions of review officers in the dwindling 
number of two-tier jurisdictions (supra note 4) and the policy interpretations of 
the administering agencies for the IDEA and, to a limited extent within its 
overlap with the IDEA, Section 504 (infra note 16). 
13 John M. Malotunik, Beyond Actual Bias: A Fuller Approach to Impartiality 
in School Exclusion Cases, CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 112, 115 (2018) 
(characterizing the prevailing standards in such cases as “thin” and advocating 
a thicker approach that approximates appearance of bias). 
14 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2017). 
15 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Peter Winebrake, Legal Boundaries of Partiality and 
Misconduct of Labor Arbitrators, 1992 DET. C.L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1992) 
(citing the intermediate standard in Morelite Constr. Co. v. N.T.C. Dist. Council 
Carpenters Benefits Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1984)).   
16  Peter J. Maher & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review 
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Checklist of 
the Legal Boundaries, 83 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 109, 111–14 (2007). 
17 E.g., Martin Diebold & Robert Simpson, An Investigation of the Effect of Due 
Process Hearing Officer on Placement Decisions, 11 DIAGNOSTIQUE 69, 74 
(1986) (finding that occupational background of IHOs in Alabama did not 
appear to affect their placement decisions); James Newcomer, Perry A. Zirkel, 
& Ralph Tarola, Characteristics and Outcomes of Special Education Hearing 
and Review Officer Cases, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 449, 453–56 (1998) (finding a 
significant difference in outcomes between Pennsylvania IHOs with and those 
without experience in education); Geoffrey F. Schultz & Joseph R. McKinney, 
Special Education Due Process: Hearing Officer Background and Case 
Variable Effects on Decisions Outcomes, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 24 (2000) 
(finding in a midwestern state that settlement rates were higher for IHOs who 
were attorneys than for those who were not attorneys); Ann P. Turnbull, Bonnie 
Strickland, & H. Rutherford Turnbull, Due Process Hearing Officers: 
3
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in primary legal sources and exclusively focused on IHO 
impartiality.18  In the first, which dates back to 1993, Drager 
and Zirkel divided the relevant sources, including court 
decisions and agency policy interpretations, 19  into two 
categories—"structural,” including per se, and “situational” 
bias.20  In the structural category, they found that courts and 
agencies had established the subsequently codified21 per se 
prohibition against state education agency (“SEA”) and local 
education agency (“LEA”) employees from serving as either 
IHOs or, in two-tier states, review officers (“RO”s).22 At the 
situational level, they concluded that courts and agencies 
gravitated more toward an actual bias than an appearance of 
bias approach.23  
Next, in the predecessor of the present analysis, 
Maher and Zirkel synthesized the cumulative court decisions, 
 
Characteristics, Needs, and Appointment Criteria, 48 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 48, 
51 (1981) (finding in a survey of North Carolina district personnel who were 
responsible for appointing IHOs that the respondents' primary criterion for 
determining impartiality was the IHO's ability to be objective, regardless of 
prior school district experience). 
18 Elaine A. Drager & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality Under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 86 EDUC. L. REP. 11 (1993); Maher & Zirkel, supra 
note 16. 
19 Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 21–22, 35.  The relevant agencies are parts 
of the U.S. Department of Education: (1) the Office of Special Education and 
Rehabilitation Services (OSERS) and its subsidiary that administers the 
IDEA—the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP), and (2) the Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR), which administers Section 504 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act in the K–12 context.  See 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/or/index.html.   
20 Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 14–17. 
21 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
22 Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 20–24.  However, the cited case law largely 
arose from the approach for administrative adjudicators generally rather than 
IDEA IHOs specifically, such as Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 
983, 998 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying standard of “actual bias or hostility,” citing 
cases arising from state agency adjudications not tied to special education or 
another particular administrative sub-area).  See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
23 Drager & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 29. 
4
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RO decisions, 24  and federal agency interpretations as of 
2007 into a checklist template.25  More specifically, their 
template consisted of a table that (a) in its rows identified 
various more specific categories within the overall Drager 
and Zirkel framework that had arisen in this cumulative body 
of law, such as employment, occupation, relationship, and 
conduct, and (b) in its rows placed an entry for each column, 
footnoting the supporting sources, within a four-part 
continuum ranging from “clearly impartial” to “clearly 
biased.”26  They found that the majority of the entries were 
in the “presumptively impartial” category, although it was 
not entirely clear whether the basis for the classification was 
the underlying approach or the ultimate outcome.27  In any 
event, the only cited instances of an outcome adverse to the 
IHOs or ROs impartiality were in either the per se categories 
of SEA or LEA employment28 or the presumptively biased 
category of ex parte communications. 29   Overall, they 
concluded that for the various situational categories the 
 
24 Although of clearly less legal weight than IHO decisions, review officer 
decisions more frequently address the impartiality issue of the first tier.  Maher 
& Zirkel, supra note 16, at 122.  Moreover, at the time of the Maher and Zirkel 
analysis, the number of two-tier states, although notably decreased from the 
Drager and Zirkel analysis, still accounted for approximately a third of the states.  
Id.   
25 Supra note 18. They also pointed out that state laws added more specific 
standards, although only identifying two examples.  Maher & Zirkel, supra note 
16, at 110 n.11, 115–19, 120 n.62. 
26 Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 115–19.  Their table provide a parallel but 
differentiated set of entries for IHOs and ROs, respectively, in light of the still 
notable frequency of states with and sources specific to a second tier.  See supra 
note 24. 
27 Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 116–17 nn.36, 41.  For instance, they listed 
various contractual-relationship situations in the “clearly biased” category, but 
the cited agency interpretations and case law used the per se employment 
categories only as a reference point for an ad hoc approach that had an adverse 
outcome in these particular situations.  Id. 
28 Id. at 115 nn.32–33. 
29 Id. at 116 n.43 (citing Hollenback v. Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 658, 668–69 
(N.D. Ill. 1988); Murphy v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 460 A.2d 398, 401 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1983)). 
5
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judicial appearance-of-bias standard was not applicable,30 
and instead, the prevailing approach was deferential.31  Their 
recommendations included (1) development of a customized 
approach, (2) IDEA regulatory requirements for disclosure, 
and (3) state law expansion of the per se categories and 
appointment procedures that remove or counterbalance 
district participation.32   
 
I. PURPOSE AND METHOD   
The purpose of this article is to provide an update of 
the Maher and Zirkel case law analysis, with limited 
appropriate adjustments.  More specifically, the template 
remains the same except for two adjustments: (1) based on 
the limited remaining number of two-tier jurisdictions and 
the similarly reduced applicable case law specific to the 
second tier, the focus is on IHOs with the limited citations 
specific to review officers integrated into the footnotes for 
the entries in each row;33 and (2) for differentiation from the 
original version, the new item content is italicized and the 
 
30  Id. at 120.  However, rather than the customized approach that they 
recommended based on the small community of special education, the cited 
court decision, which is one of the few analyses that specifically addressed the 
issue, relied on the aforementioned “actual bias, hostility or prejudgment” 
approach derived from more general administrative adjudications.  Falmouth 
Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 106 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Me. 2000) (citing 
Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1064–66 (7th Cir. 1994); Roland M. v. 
Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 997–98 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
31 Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 120.  “With the exception of the items that 
clearly violate statutory and regulatory prohibitions, the prevailing rationale 
appears to be to defer to the impartiality of the [IHO or RO].”  Id. 
32 Id. at 121–22. 
33 Connolly et al., supra note 4, at 157–58; Lukasik, supra note 4, at 745 n.38; 
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 115–19; Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due 
Process Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act II: The 
Post-Hearing Stage, 40 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 3 n.9 (2020); 
see supra note 27.  
 
6
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prior entries are listed in small parentheticals.34   
The data collection was from two overlapping 
electronic databases: Westlaw and LRP’s 
SpecialEdConnection®,35 and the selection was limited to 
the period January 1, 200736 to September 1, 2020.37  The 
Boolean search included variations of not only “impartiality,” 
but the obverse or overlapping terms of “bias,” 
“disqualification,” and “recusal” in connection with the 
“Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” and “hearing 
officer.”  Clarifying the boundaries for selection among the 
resulting rulings, the exclusions were for (a) impartiality 
cases resolved on grounds other than the merits;38 (b) cases 
in which the impartiality issue was only incidental and 
 
34 The parenthetical entries are only approximations due to the aforementioned 
imprecision and the elimination of the separate set of RO items.  Maher & Zirkel, 
supra note 16, at 116–17 nn.36, 41; see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
35 This specialized database includes not only court decisions but also agency 
interpretations as well as IHO and RO decisions in the context of the IDEA and 
Section 504.  The citations to this source are to “IDELR” or for what 
approximately corresponds to WL citations, “LRP.” 
36 The starting date was based on the approximate ending of Maher and Zirkel’s 
coverage.  The limited sources that they identified in 2007 were excluded herein.  
Maher & Zirkel, supra note 16, at 109–22. 
37 The final check for the selection “data” was October 1, 2020, thus leaving 
only a limited possibility of the belated publication of additional relevant cases 
decided prior to September 1, 2020. 
38 E.g., R.R. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 366 F. App’x 239 (2d Cir. 
2010); Horen v. Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (waiver); 
H.H. v. Ind. Bd. of Special Educ. Appeals, 50 IDELR ¶ 34 (N.D. Ind. 2008) 
(dismissed as systemic claim not part of original complaint); J.N. v. S.W. Sch. 
Dist., 55 F. Supp. 3d 589 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (admission of supplementary 
evidence concerning alleged bias); H.C. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 528 F. App’x 
64 (2d Cir. 2013) (inadmissible evidence, as part of the line of cases re New 
York’s RO); B.D. v. District of Columbia, 77 IDELR ¶ 124 (D.D.C. 2020); D.T. 
v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 75 IDELR ¶ 224 (M.D. Tenn. 2019); Donahue v. Kan. 
Bd. of Educ., 75 IDELR ¶ 12 (D. Kan. 2019); Avaras v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 75 IDELR ¶ 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); R.S. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 899 F. 
Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); H.A. v. Teaneck Bd. of Educ., 54 IDELR ¶ 98 
(D.N.J. 2010) (subject to or subordinated within exhaustion); Haw. Dep’t of 
Educ. v. Zachary B., 52 IDELR ¶ 213 (D. Haw. Dec. 31, 2009) (subsumed 
within remedial delegation). 
7
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unspecific;39 and (c) impartiality cases in which the IHO or 
RO was responding to a motion for recusal rather than it 
being a subject of review by a higher adjudicative level.40  
Thus, the included cases started at the RO level.41  Finally, 
the scope was limited to impartiality, not the overlapping but 
separable issue of competence,42 of IHOs.43   
 
II. FINDINGS   
The following table provides the resulting updated 
checklist, with due differentiation from the findings for the 
prior period for a more complete and comparative 








39 E.g., M.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Sch., 720 F. App’x 280, 284 n.3 (6th Cir. 
2018); Doe v. Attleboro Pub. Sch., 960 F. Supp. 2d 286, 296 n.5 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(tangential mention without sufficiently specific nature of claim); In re Student 
with a Disability, 115 LRP 27798 (N.Y. SEA 2015) (general conclusory 
allegations). 
40 E.g., Harford Cnty. Pub. Sch. 117 LRP 23626 (Md. SEA 2016); Duxbury Pub. 
Sch., 108 LRP 64293 (Mass. SEA 2008) (IHO recusal rulings); Bd. of Educ. of 
Mex. Acad., 107 LRP 64195 (N.Y. SEA 2007) (RO recusal ruling). 
41 “SEA” in the parenthetical for a case citation herein designates a decision at 
the IHO or RO level. 
42 For the competence criteria, the most recent amendments of the IDEA added 
directly after the aforementioned impartiality standards, see 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(f)(3)(A)(ii)–(iv). 
43 For cases that addressed both issues, the coverage here was limited to the 
ruling specific to impartiality. E.g., A.M. v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 
2d 193, 207 (D.D.C. 2013) (ruling that IHO’s efficient management of the 
hearing for timeliness did not violate impartiality, with intertwined treatment of 
competence issue). 
44 For the original version, representing the prior period, see Maher & Zirkel, 
supra note 16, at 115–19.  Here, the italicized items in column 1 are additions, 
and the small parenthetical entries in the other columns are for the prior period.  
See supra text accompanying note 34 and accompanying text.   
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or other  
employee 
of the SEA 







of the party 
LEA   









 ✓47(✓)   
 
45 Letter to Chester, 52 IDELR ¶ 106 (OSERS 2009) (interpreting IDEA regs 
as clearly prohibiting IHOs from being SEA employees and suggesting 
acceptable alternatives for the inquiring state to have them serve as separate 
state employees). 
46 Greendale (WI) Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 155 (OCR 2014); Matthews Cnty. 
(VA) Pub. Sch., 114 LRP 42768 (OCR 2014); Norwalk (CT) Pub. Sch., 108 
LRP 21708 (OCR 2007); Ferguson-Florissant (MO) R-II Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 
42444 (OCR 2007) (for district’s § 504 hearings—usually via confusion with 
504 grievance procedure). 
47 C.E. v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 695 F. App’x 621, 624–25 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(finding the former superintendent of another LEA years earlier was complying 
with N.Y. regulation requiring at least a two-year gap). 
9
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private attorney for 
LEA's law firm    (✓) 
private attorney who 
represented other LEAs 
and/or other parents 
 ✓49(✓)   
professor at a state college  
or university  
 (✓)   
professor who participated 
in state special education 
policy formulation 
   (✓)  
Relationships 
continuing relationship 
with SEA employee 
 ✓50(✓)   
prior contact with either 
party or parties' attorney  
 ✓51(✓)   
continuing consulting 
relationship with LEA 
  (✓)  
contractual relationship 
with other LEAs 
 ✓52   
Personal Characteristics 
negligible connection of  
family members (✓)    
  
 
49  SCO of Fam. Serv., 2017 LRP 43926 (N.Y. SEA 2017) (disclosed and 
nonprejudicial). 
50 J.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (no evidence 
of substantive involvement or effect); W.T. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C. Sch. Dist., 
716 F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (cohabitation of review officer with SEA 
special education attorney). 
51 Allyson B. v. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit No. 23, 54 IDELR ¶ 64 
(E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, A.B. v. Montgomery Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 409 F. 
App’x 602 (3d Cir. 2011) (party attorney formerly worked as fellow IHO—due 
process>IHO manual); In re Student with a Disability, 113 LRP 16887 (N.Y. 
SEA 2013) (unproven and no showing of actual bias, though recommending 
disclosure). 
52 In re Student with a Disability, 112 LRP 8925 (N.Y. SEA 2012) (although 
disclosure would have been preferable). 
11
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Performance or Product 
prehearing conduct  ✓53   
prior decisions  ✓54(✓)   
ex parte communications  ✓55 (✓)  
hearing conduct and/or  ✓56(✓)   
 
53 Morrison v. Perry Sch. Dep’t, 2019 WL 3035283 (D. Me. July 11, 2019), 
adopted, 2019 WL 3502879 (D. Me. Aug. 1, 2019) (prehearing motions); James 
D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (denial of request 
for neutral location—contrary to state law); E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 119 
LRP 4661 (N.Y. SEA 2018); In re Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 56226 
(N.Y. SEA 2008) (broad-based challenge extending to hearing conduct and 
decision preparation but including prehearing scheduling). 
54 Cruz v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 74 IDELR ¶ 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining 
that legal errors in prior proceeding “rarely suffice”); Dep’t of Educ. v. Ria L., 
64 IDELR ¶ 236 (D. Haw. 2014) (prior rulings before remand were not 
extrajudicial and, in any event, did not show appearance of bias); N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Educ., 119 LRP 4663 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (comments re prior decision for same 
parties); In re Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 47584 (DODEA 2008) 
(administrative rather than substantive matters without material effect); cf. K.I. 
v. Durham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 76 IDELR ¶ 287 (M.D.N.C. 2020) (in 
context of exhaustion, prior adverse ruling on timing did not overcome 
presumption of impartiality); Price v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 214 
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (no violation for failure to disclose superficial involvement with 
prior case re same child, albeit referring to state appearance-of-impartiality 
ethical standards for IDEA IHOs); R.S. v. Lakeland Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 211 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); R.E. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 785 F. Supp. 2d 28 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); TC v. 
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 777 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); C.G. v. New 
York City Dep’t of Educ., 752 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); W.T. v. Bd. 
of Educ. of N.Y.C. Sch. Dist., 716 F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); J.N. v. 
Pittsburgh City. Sch. Dist., 536 F. Supp. 2d 564 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (among line 
of cases regarding box score statistics concerning review officer—insufficient 
alone, as with judges generally). 
55  James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(unproven); W.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(disclosed per state law and harmless effect); In re Student with a Disability, 
109 LRP 47579 (DOD SEA 2008); In re Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 
47584 (DOD SEA 2008) (rejected here as administrative rather than 
substantive). 
56 Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 2018); Nickerson-Reti v. 
Lexington Pub. Sch., 893 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Mass. 2012) (credibility 
determinations); Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dep’t., 382 F. Supp. 3d 83 (D. Me. 
2019); D.S. v. Parsippany Troy Hills Bd. of Educ., 73 IDELR ¶ 143 (D.N.J. 
2018); B.H. v. Joliet Sch. Dist. No. 86, 54 IDELR ¶ 121 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Wilson 
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v. Colbert Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 11424188 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2008); 
Slater v. Exeter-W. Greenwich Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2067719 (D.R.I. July 16, 
2007); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 119 LRP 1582 (N.Y. SEA 2018); In re Student 
with a Disability, 2018 LRP 50601 (N.Y. SEA 2018); In re Student with a 
Disability, 2017 LRP 13921 (N.Y. SEA 2017) (disagreement with unfavorable 
decision); Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.M., 2019 WL4735735 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 28, 2018); In re Student with a Disability, 2015 LRP 51106 (N.Y. SEA 
2015) (alleged undue weight to other side’s evidence in decision); Genn v. New 
Haven Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 296 (D. Conn. 2016) (curt comments to 
parent side in response to their discourteous conduct—no prejudicial effect 
shown); In re Student with a Disability, 118 LRP 50584 (N.Y. SEA 2018) 
(incivility to both parties); A.M. v. District of Columbia., 933 F. Supp. 2d 193 
(D.D.C. 2013) (curtailing off-point evidence and active>asleep); In re Student 
with a Disability, 119 LRP 41379 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (familiarity with a 
witness—disclosed and partial analogy to case law re judges); In re Student 
with a Disability, 115 LRP 50231 (N.Y. SEA 2015); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 
107 LRP 53514 (N.Y. SEA 2007) (activist IHO—not contrary to state regs); 
Sudbury Pub. Sch. v. Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 762 F. 
Supp. 2d 254 (D. Mass. 2010) (active questioning of witnesses); Bd. of Educ. 
v. Risen, 61 IDELR ¶ 130 (N.D. Ill. 2013); M.N. v. Rolla Pub. Sch. Dist. 31, 
59 IDELR ¶ 44 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (marginal within context of deference—
comments in management of hearing); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F. 
Supp. 2d 928 (E.D. Va. 2010); S.A. v. Exeter Union Sch. Dist., 2010 WL 
4942539 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (marginal within context of deference—
active questioning of witnesses); J.C. v. New Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 56 IDELR 
¶ 207 (D. Conn. 2011) (marginal as alternative to inapplicability of state APA—
both decision and nonprejudicial evidentiary determinations); Avila v. Spokane 
Sch. Dist. No. 81, 71 IDELR ¶ 172 (E.D. Wash. 2018), aff’d on other grounds, 
744 F. App’x 506 (9th Cir. 2019); J.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 
153 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); E.S. v. Katonah-Lewisboro Sch. Dist., 742 F. Supp. 2d 
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 487 F. App’x 619 (2d Cir. 2012); 
W.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Potsdam 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 117 LRP 13961 (N.Y. SEA 2017); In re Student with a 
Disability, 115 LRP 20886 (N.Y. SEA 2015); In re Student with a Disability, 
113 LRP 7510 (Okla. SEA 2011); Richmond Heights Local Sch. Dist., 116 LRP 
31041 (Oh. SEA 2016); York Cnty. Sch. Dist. Three, 108 LRP 70128 (S.C. SEA 
2007) (evidentiary determinations, including time constraints); Wanham v. 
Everett Pub. Sch., 550 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (D. Mass. 2008); In re Student with 
a Disability, 119 LRP 41383 (N.Y. SEA 2019); In re Student with a Disability, 
119 LRP 36208 (N.Y. SEA 2019); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50597 (N.Y. 
SEA 2018), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Soria v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 
74 IDELR ¶ 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (conduct and decision); In re Student with a 
Disability, 118 LRP 33995 (N.Y. SEA 2018); York Cnty. Sch. Dist. Three, 108 
LRP 6769 (S.C. SEA 2008) (broad-based challenge to IHO conduct and 
decision, such as curtailing evidence––broad state regs + harmless error); Akron 
Bd. of Educ., 116 LRP 10766 (Oh. SEA 2015), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Barney v. Akron Bd. of Educ., 763 F. App’x 528 (6th Cir. 2019) (unproven 
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internal consultation process (✓)    
lack of parental participation 
in selection 
(✓)    
• participation by LEA  ✓57(✓)   
Miscellaneous 
public disability-related  
expression 
  ✓58  
 
Overall, the updated items and entries follow a similar 
pattern to the previous iteration, with the presumption of 
impartiality being the prevailing approach—with the 
exception of the codified per se categories of SEA and LEA 
employment.  On successive levels of closer examination, 
other, more specific findings emerge. 
First, the entries for the more recent period, when 
examined in tandem with the footnoted sources, reveal that 
the per se employment prohibitions are limited to agency 
reinforcement,59 whereas the bulk of the case law has shifted 
to the performance and product area.  More specifically, 
although IHO relationships continue to be an area of 
occasional litigation, 60  IHO conduct and decisions have 
become the focal categories of impartiality challenges and 
rulings.61   
Second, the approach evident in these expanding 
 
defamation of parent’s counsel).  But cf. In re Student with a Disability, 119 
LRP 36210 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (mistake and abuse of discretion but not sufficient 
for bias); N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50576 (N.Y. SEA 2018) (remanding 
for new IHO based on abundance of caution). 
57 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Virtual Educ. Software, Inc., 111 LRP 65918 (Nev. 
SEA 2011) (broad-based including payment of IHO fee). 
58 Cf. Stengle v. Off. of Disp. Resol., 631 F.2d 564 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (rejected 
First Amendment and § 504 claims of nonrenewed IHO who engaged in 
disability advocacy via a blog—publicly perceived lack of impartiality). 
59 Supra notes 45–46. 
60 Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying entries. 
61 Supra notes 53–56 and accompanying entries. 
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areas of case law is a rather consistent presumption in favor 
of the IHO’s impartiality.62  Examination of the cited cases 
reveals that the presumption is usually tied to administrative 
law judges rather than “traditional” judges.63  For example, 
First Circuit courts have continued to apply the “actual bias 
and hostility” and its intertwined “presumption of honesty 
and integrity” approach, 64  which is applicable to 
administrative adjudicators in general.65   Courts in other 
jurisdictions have similarly and expressly applied this 
deferential approach. 66   Alternatively, other courts have 
provided corresponding IHO latitude via an outcome-based 
approach, whether via a two-step approach of procedural 
FAPE under the IDEA,67  or a more general approach of 
prejudicial effect. 68   Overall, these prevailing variations 
came much closer to an actual appearance of bias approach, 
 
62 Supra notes 53–57 and accompanying entries. 
63  The use of “traditional” in this context is not uncommon but only 
approximate. E.g., Sherrod v. Birnbaum, 457 F. App’x 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 (E.D. Ark. 1999).  Like the 
corresponding use of “hidden” for administrative law judges, it is subject to 
changing awareness over time.  E.g., Yoder, supra note 11, at 323 (citing, inter 
alia, Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the “Hidden Judiciary”: How the Merits 
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges, 63 JUDICATURE 60 
(1979)). 
64  E.g., Johnson v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182, 193–94 (1st Cir. 2018); 
Morrison v. Perry Sch. Dep’t, 2019 WL 3035283, 23 (D. Me. July 11, 2019), 
adopted, 2019 WL 3502879 (D. Me. Aug. 1, 2019); Nickerson-Reti v. 
Lexington Pub. Sch., 893 F. Supp. 2d 276, 288 (D. Mass. 2012). 
65 For the precedent cited in these cases, see supra notes 22, 30. 
66 E.g., A.M. v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193, 206 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(“A hearing officer enjoys ‘a presumption of honesty and integrity, which is 
only rebutted by a showing of some substantial countervailing reason to 
conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased,’” citing a D.C. Circuit 
decision referring to administrative adjudications generally); M.N. v. Rolla Pub. 
Sch. Dist. 31, 59 IDELR ¶ 44 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (“Administrative officers are 
presumed to be unbiased,” citing an Eighth Circuit decision concerning federal 
ALJs). 
67 E.g., James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (no 
resulting FAPE effect on student or parents).  For this two-step approach, see 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2018). 
68 E.g., Genn v. New Haven Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311(D. Conn. 
2016) (failure to show that the IHO’s conduct affected the case outcome).   
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with the exceptions being almost negligible.69 
Third, an examination of the footnoted case law 
reveals that state law standards have played a role in a more 
than negligible, but still rather limited number of the cases.70  
Moreover, although the specific state law standard has been 
outcome-determinative in the occasional case, 71  it has at 
least as often been of non-controlling significance.72 
At the final and perhaps most telling level, an 
examination of the outcomes of the cited sources for this 
2007–2020 period reveals that the various challenges to IHO 
impartiality have almost entirely been unsuccessful, with the 
limited exception of the agency determinations in the per se 
employment category.73  Indeed, none of the second-tier and 
court reviews has rendered a ruling of IHO impartiality.74  
The closest to such a ruling were two recent New York RO 
decisions.75  In the first of these decisions, the RO concluded 
that “there is insufficient evidence on the record to 
affirmatively establish bias on the part of the IHO.” 76  
 
69 Cf. Dep’t of Educ. v. Ria L., 64 IDELR ¶ 236 (D. Haw. 2014) (default use of 
appearance of bias); In re Student with a Disability, 119 LRP 41383 (N.Y. SEA 
2019) (alternative use of actual and appearance of bias); In re Student with a 
Disability, 119 LRP 41379 (N.Y. SEA 2019) (alternative use of judicial analogy 
with due distinction). 
70 Supra notes 55–58 and accompanying entries. 
71 E.g., C.E. v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 695 F. App’x 621, 625 (2d Cir. 
2017) (ruling that IHO, a former superintendent of another LEA earlier in his 
career, complied with N.Y. regulation requiring at least two-year gap). 
72 E.g., James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(ruling that IHO’s denial of request for neutral location, while contrary to state 
law, raised “legitimate concerns,” but the parent failed to show that it denied 
the child a FAPE or demonstrated bias).   
73 Supra notes 45-46 and accompanying entries. 
74 As a result, an RO’s repeated conclusion that “[a]llegations of hearing officer 
bias and lack of impartiality are rarely successful”  amounts to an overstatement 
for the case law during the last several years.  Richmond Heights Local Sch. 
Dist., 116 LRP 31041, at 25 (Oh. SEA 2016); Akron Bd. of Educ., 116 LRP 
10766, at 20 (Oh. SEA 2015), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Barney v. Akron 
Bd. of Educ., 763 F. App’x 528 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). 
75 In re Student with a Disability, 119 LRP 36210 (N.Y. SEA 2019); N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50576 (N.Y. SEA 2018). 
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However, in the absence in the record or in the decision of 
an explanation for the IHO’s denial of recusal, the RO, “in 
an abundance of caution,” remanded the case to another 
IHO.77  In the subsequent decision, the RO concluded: 
Here, although I have found that the IHO 
should have taken into account the 
scheduling of the impartial hearing and 
abused his discretion in his evidentiary 
rulings, the error did not create an 
appearance of partiality in favor of the 
district nor was there evidence of actual 
bias on behalf of the IHO.78  
 
However, as additional assurance, the RO accepted 
additional evidence and modified the IHO’s decision to 
remediate the error.79   
 
Discussion 
Impartiality is an inherently critical criterion for 
hearing officers, as it is for traditional judges.  However, two 
countervailing interests merit consideration in formulating 
and interpreting the applicable standards.  The first 
countervailing interest is applicable to administrative law 
judges and other such hearing officers in general.  The 
aforementioned 80  Falmouth court opinion insightfully 
expressed this countervailing cluster of considerations as 
follows: 
[T]here are powerful 
institutional interests in 
making post-decision 
challenges to an adjudicator 
the exception and not the rule.  
 
76 N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 118 LRP 50576 (N.Y. SEA 2018), at *9–10. 
77 Id. at *10. 
78 In re Student with a Disability, 119 LRP 36210 (N.Y. SEA 2019), at *10. 
79 Id. at 11. 
80 Supra note 30. 
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Each losing party searches for 
every possible reason to 
attack a negative decision, 
and issues that were 
insignificant or evanescent 
before the decision suddenly 
and unfairly (to the other 
party and the adjudicator) 
become monumental.  An 
“appellate” tribunal is seldom 
in a good position to make the 
necessary factual 
determination. Discovery 
presents its own dangers.  
Unless a very high standard is 
set for any disgruntled litigant 
to be able to question an 
adjudicator about his/her 
personal affairs, fishing 
expeditions on the subject 
will be inevitable.81 
 
The second countervailing consideration is missing 
in the applicable case law to date—the specialized purpose 
and nature of the IDEA. 82   As for its purpose, “[t]he 
legislative history, statutory terms, and regulatory 
framework of the IDEA [that] all emphasize promptness as 
an indispensable element of the statutory scheme.”83  As for 
 
81 Falmouth Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 106 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Me. 
2000). 
82 See generally About IDEA, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, https://sites.ed.gov/idea/about-idea/#IDEA-
Purpose. 
83 E.g., Amann v. Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 932 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Spiegler v. 
District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Adler v. Educ. Dep’t of 
State of N.Y., 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1985); Bow Sch. Dist. v. Quentin W., 750 
F. Supp. 546 (D.N.H. 1990)).  As a commonly cited example of this purpose, 
the Act’s principal sponsor emphasized the importance of promptly completed 
18
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its nature, the field of special education under the IDEA and 
its corollary state laws entails a specialized subject matter 
that is so narrowly practiced that state and local education 
agency representatives, attorneys on both sides, and IHOs 
often have occasion to interact beyond, not just within, the 
hearing process. 84   Yet, the “judicialization” of IDEA 
IHOs,85 which includes the gradual but steady increased use 
of lawyers generally and administrative law judges (“ALJ”s) 
more specifically,86 and the resulting trade-off of specialized 
expertise,87 runs the risk of (1) prolongation of the hearing 
process and (2) imposition of an insufficiently tailored 
approach to impartiality.88   
 
due process hearings.  Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1060 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 71, 80 n.8 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(citing Senator Williams’ statement in the final Senate debate at 121 CONG. 
REC. 37,416 (1975)). 
84  This narrowly specialized field not only yields repeat players at IDEA 
hearings but also informal and formal interactions at conferences and other 
professional activities focused on special education law.  Connolly et al., supra 
note 4, at 161.    
85 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping 
Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 38–44 (2007) (finding a gradual 
increase in varying objective indicators of legalization in the IHO decisions in 
a single state).  
86 Connolly et al., supra note 4, at 161 (finding a “judicialization trend” toward 
legal background in place of special education background and toward full-time 
ALJs rather than part-time IHOs).  The shift to ALJs is often without careful 
connection to and customization of the generic nature of state APA laws, thus 
causing not only ambiguities to the extent of their application, particularly when 
conflicting with state special education laws, but also disharmonies with the 
particular spirit and nature of the IDEA. 
87 A foundational pillar of judicial deference to IDEA IHOs is the presumption 
that they, unlike courts, have particular expertise in this specialized field.  E.g., 
T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 810 F.3d 869, 875 (2d Cir. 2016); Doe v. E. 
Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 450 (3d Cir. 2015) (recognizing IHOs’ 
“specialized knowledge and experience”); L.M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. 
Dist., 462 F. App’x 745, 747 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing IHOs’ special “expertise”); 
Lessard v. Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(relying on IHOs’ “specialized knowledge). 
88 As a baseline for the time-consuming over-legalized approach, a legal scholar 
on the eve of the passage of the IDEA, in the wake of experience with the 
hearing process in Pennsylvania under PARC v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 
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Instead, similar to the relatively small and 
specialized context of labor arbitration, 89  a customized 
approach that approximates actual, rather than appearance of, 
bias continues to be un-realized but warranted for the 
impartiality of IDEA IHOs.90  Courts that face impartiality 
challenges and the corollary state laws under the IDEA need 
to add this reinforcing customized consideration.  More 
specifically, because the structural areas of employment and 
occupation are largely settled, 91  the priority for the 
reinforcing customized approach is secondarily in the 
continuing relationship subcategories,92 and primarily in the 
expanding performance and product subcategories.93  The 
more general presumption of impartiality is in the 
appropriate direction,94 but needs fine-tuning in light of the 
specialized purpose and nature of the IDEA.95  Moreover, 
 
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), concluded that (1) dead-center impartiality was not the 
appropriate standard, (2) IHOs should have professional expertise in special 
education, and (3) “[t]he trick is to get a much efficiency as possible.”  William 
Buss, What Procedural Due Process Means to a School Psychologist, 13 J. SCH. 
PSYCH. 278, 304–06 (1975).  For similar scholarly early warnings against over-
proceduralization, see Zirkel, supra note 11, at 26 n.128 (citing David Kirp, 
William Buss, & Peter Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical 
Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 154 (1974); Maynard 
C. Reynolds, More Process Than Is Due, 14 THEORY INTO PRAC. 61 (1975)).  
The use of central panel ALJs and state APA laws, which are overlapping but 
not coterminous for IDEA hearings, may each be appropriate policies on a state-
by-state basis but only on a carefully harmonized with state special education 
laws for net effectiveness of IHO hearings; see, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 33, at 
23–24.   
89 Supra text accompanying note 15. 
90 For the earlier recommendation that the courts have yet to incorporate, see 
supra text accompanying note 32. 
91 Supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
92 Supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
93 Supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
94 Supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.  The outcomes pattern seems to 
show an almost absolute presumption but it warrants moderation in light of the 
possible skewing effect of prophylactic recusals.  The specific extent of this 
factor is unknown, as is the extent of the possible intervening effect of the 
parties’ legal counsels’ disincentive to put impartiality in question for IHOs 
whom they may face in future cases. 
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the appearance of bias approach, which appears in some of 
the applicable state laws,96 merits reallocation to ethical and 
best-practice prophylaxis rather than a reversible 
requirement for IDEA ALJs.97 
This proposal for a customized standard is intended 
to stimulate discussion, debate, and resulting legislative and 
judicial refinements that provide latitude for carefully 
considered state variation under the IDEA, including central 
and specialized panels of ALJs.98  This consideration should 
focus on the two successive areas of applicable legal activity 
during this lengthy updated period. 
 
95 Cf. P.M.B. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 944 F.3d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(concluding that the Congressional intent for “expedient resolution of [IDEA] 
claims” overrode applying the state APA legislation’s filing period for state 
courts to federal court appeals of IHO decisions). 
96 In addition to the three state laws identified in Zirkel, supra note 11, at 17 
(Colorado, Iowa, and Maryland), others are Indiana, New Jersey, and 
Tennessee.  IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3-10 (2017) (listing in addition to various other 
grounds for disqualification “any cause for which a judge of a court may be 
disqualified”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1.1 App. (attaching Code of Conduct for 
ALJs as appendix for APA regulations for Office of Administrative Law); 
TENN. COMP. R & REGS. (2018) (incorporating canons 1–4 of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct).  The state laws of all of these states, except Iowa, are general 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provisions for ALJs generally rather than 
within the laws specific to the special education context.  Moreover, even for 
ALJs, the standards for traditional judges merit careful adjustment.  For 
example, pointing out that IHO impartiality overlaps with IHO independence, 
Mayes observed that the administrative law judiciary generally is more 
susceptible to external forces; see generally Thomas A. Mayes, Protecting the 
Administrative Judiciary from External Pressures: A Call for Vigilance, 60 
DRAKE L. REV. 827 (2012).  For the independence interest associated with 
central panel ALJs, see Malcolm C. Rich & Alison C. Goldstein, The Need for 
a Central Panel Approach to Administrative Adjudication: Pros, Cons, and 
Selected Practices, 39 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2019).  
97 Similarly, provisions for IHO training, evaluation and remediation, renewal, 
or removal are a separate matter that should have more strict standards for 
impartiality. 
98 Approximately twenty states use central panels as IDEA IHOs, and three 
additional jurisdictions—the D.C., Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania—have 
separate specialized panels of ALJs for this purpose.  Connolly et al., supra note 
4, at 158. 
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For the primary priority area of IHO performance 
and product, various state law provisions make explicit what 
is otherwise implicit under the IDEA—IHOs have the 
authority as well as responsibility to manage the hearing 
process actively so as fulfill the IDEA regulatory 
requirement to issue the decision within 45 days of the 
completion of the resolution process.99  These provisions, 
which predominate in the state laws within the specific 
context of the IDEA, include limiting (1) testimony,100 (2) 
extensions,101 and (3) hearing sessions.102  Thus, IHOs who 
actively manage the hearing for prompt completion should 
be protected from impartiality challenges except where the 
complaining party proves a prejudicial effect, such as denial 
of FAPE. 103   Conversely, state laws that provide for 
inefficient selection or assignment,104 peremptory strikes,105 
easy self-recusals, 106  formal recusal reviews, 107  or other 
 
99 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (requiring issuance of the decision within 45 calendar 
days after expiration of the resolution period, with the limited exception of 
“specific extensions . . . at the request of either party”).  The resolution process, 
which the 2004 amendments of the IDEA added, is a 30-day period designed to 
facilitate settlement of the matter prior to the hearing.  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(f)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.510. 
100 Zirkel, supra note 11, at 20 (Arkansas’ and Hawaii’s special education laws 
as examples). 
101 Id. at 21–22 (examples include Alaska’s, Arkansas’, Connecticut’s, and New 
York’s special education laws). 
102 Id. at 23 (examples include Arkansas’, New York’s, and Vermont’s special 
education laws). 
103 Cf. James D. v. Bd. of Educ., 642 F. Supp. 2d 804, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (two-
step procedural FAPE analysis for other, non-timing impartiality challenges). 
104 Zirkel, supra note 11, at 19 (Montana’s ranking system). 
105 Id. at 19–20 (five states, with Kansas being the most extreme).  Moreover, 
the possibility of the due process hearing complainant simply withdrawing the 
complaint and filing another complaint within the limitations period as an “end 
run” peremptory strike is a problem in states that use a rotational system rather 
than assigning the same IHO to the case. 
106 E.g., MONT. ADMIN R. 10.16.3509 (2017) (permitting withdrawal at any 
point that the IHO perceives a personal or professional interest “might conflict 
with the [IHO’s] objectivity”). 
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more generic ALJ procedures and practices that do not 
conform to the IDEA-specific primacy on promptness 
should be adjusted or eliminated.108 
For the secondary priority area of relationships, the 
continuing direction of the applicable case law only needs 
fine-tuned reinforcement in light of the inevitable frequent 
contacts within the relatively small community.  Disclosure 
has a particularly prophylactic effect, although it is neither 
an automatic cure-all nor an absolute prerequisite.109 
Overall, this update shows that the impartiality of 
IHOs under the IDEA merits further customization so as to 
facilitate the prompt completion of the hearing process.110  
This efficiency of dispute resolution under the IDEA is 
essential for not only the individual interest child with 
disabilities, for whom the window of opportunity for 
learning is particularly important, but also the institutional 
interests of local education agencies, for which funding is 
limited and the priority is instruction.  Finally, this broad but 
well-tailored latitude is also in the intermediary interest of 
IDEA IHOs, for whom integrity, independence, and 






107 E.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, § 511 (2017) (department of administrative 
law shall determine written challenge, with substitution of another IHO where 
any doubt that first IHO is not “truly impartial”).  
108 As a consequence of the increasing use of central panel ALJs (supra note 
95), the majority of such laws are state APAs that warrant superseding careful 
customization in the state’s corresponding special education law. 
109 See supra notes 49, 51–52.  
110 This IDEA customization applies generally to state law, not just judicially 
developed, standards.  E.g., Zirkel, supra note 11, at 25–27. 
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